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AFTERMARKETFAILURE: WINDOWS XP’S END
OF SUPPORT
Andrew Tutt*
INTRODUCTION
“After 12 years, support for Windows XP will end on April 8, 2014.” So
proclaims a Microsoft website with a helpful clock counting down the days.
“What does this mean?” the website asks. “It means you should take action.”
You should “migrate to a current supported operating system – such as
Windows 8.1 – so you can receive regular security updates to protect [your]
computer from malicious attacks.” 1
The costs of mass migration will be immense. About 30% of all desktop
PCs are running Windows XP right now. 2 An estimated 10% of the U.S.
government’s computers run Windows XP, including “thousands of
computers on classified military and diplomatic networks.” 3 And the costs of
staying put? They will be enormous, too. It turns out that 95% of the world’s
ATMs are powered by Windows XP, and there is no readily available
substitute in the offing. In one example of these exorbitant costs, the price of
either extending support or upgrading to another version of Windows for
each of Britain’s major banks will be in the hundreds of millions. Costs will
be similar, or perhaps even higher, worldwide. 4
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The failure to continue to patch unpatched computers will also have
serious ramifications for society. Hackers will keep scouring Windows XP
for flaws, holes, and vulnerabilities for many years after Microsoft ends
support for its vaunted operating system. Zero-day vulnerabilities—flaws
hackers have long known about but have waited to exploit for fear that the
vulnerability will be immediately patched (and could therefore only be used
once or for a short time)—will now be exploitable in perpetuity. 5 Experts
“have repeatedly warned that April 8 could spark a hacker feeding frenzy.” 6
Yet, ironically, those who run Windows XP pose a greater threat to others
than to themselves.
In the special case of governments, enterprise businesses, and financial
institutions, failure to patch or migrate will expose the personal data of
millions of individuals to theft, fraud, and abuse. When the wave of security
breaches from unpatched machines arrives, the lawsuits against companies
for failure to secure user data properly will become even more costly. 7 There

ljHfXP1dqSiJn5MYdEBBaN/Maintaining-Windows-XP-after-8-April-may-cost-1190-crper.html; Kate Rogers, End of Windows XP Support Could Put ATMs at Risk, FOX BUS. (Mar.
19,
2014),
http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2014/03/19/end-windows-xpsupport-could-put-atms-at-risk; Matt Scuffham & David Henry, Banks To Be Hit With
Microsoft Costs for Running Outdated ATMs, REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2014, 10:57 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/14/us-banks-atms-idUSBREA2D13D20140314;
Simon Zekaria, Are the World’s ATMs Ready for April XPiration?, WALL ST. J. DIGITS (Mar. 19,
2014, 2:27 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/03/19/are-the-worlds-atms-ready-for-aprilxpiration.
5. Without support, Windows XP will suffer what’s been called “zero day forever”
because no one will be able to patch the system. See Mary Jo Foley, Microsoft warns Windows
XP users risk ‘zero day forever’, ZDNET (Aug. 16, 2013, 10:14 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/
microsoft-warns-windows-xp-users-risk-zero-day-forever-7000019503/;
Kurt
Mackie,
Windows XP Users To Face Perpetual ‘Zero Day’, REDMOND MAG. (Aug. 16, 2013),
http://redmondmag.com/articles/2013/08/16/windows-xp-zero-day.aspx; Tim Rains, The Risk
of Running Windows XP After Support Ends April 2014, MICROSOFT SECURITY BLOG (Aug. 15,
2013, 2:00 AM), http://blogs.technet.com/b/security/archive/2013/08/15/the-risk-of-runningwindows-xp-after-support-ends.aspx.
6. Brad Chacos, Avast: Windows XP Users Already Attacked 6 Times More Often than
Windows 7 Users, PC WORLD (Mar. 18, 2014, 8:33 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/
2109144/avast-windows-xp-users-already-attacked-6-times-more-often-than-windows-7users.html.
7. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Harris et al., Neiman Marcus Data Breach Worse Than First
Said, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2014, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/
business/neiman-marcus-breach-affected-1-1-million-cards.html; Alastair Jamieson & Erin
McClam, Millions of Target Customers’ Credit, Debit Card Accounts May Be Hit By Data
Breach, NBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2013, 12:07 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/
millions-target-customers-credit-debit-card-accounts-may-be-hit-f2D11775203;
Melanie
Mason, Target, Neiman Marcus Will Be No-Shows At Hearing on Data Breaches, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 14, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/14/local/la-me-pc-data-breach-hearings20140214.
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may also be immense blows to consumer confidence, leading to welfarereducing market-wide substitutions away from e-commerce. 8
Meanwhile, the many millions of consumers who do not realize the
increased vulnerability of their desktop operating systems will continue to
use Microsoft Windows XP. Perhaps they will do so because they do not
believe they are at risk. They will say that they do not do any of their
personal banking or shopping on their home computers, and they will assert
that they do not check their email or visit social networks. As a result, they
will conclude that they do not see the “need” to upgrade. 9 Yet, as long as they
connect to the internet, their continued use of XP stands to cost society
millions of dollars.
Computers do not use much of their powerful data-processing capability
or much of their available internet bandwidth from moment to moment.
Hackers love nothing more than to sneak onto computers and turn them
into secret weapons whose idle bandwidth can be used to block traffic to
enterprise websites through Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (“DDoS
Attacks”) and whose resources can be secretly co-opted to send millions of
spam emails. These hackers also relentlessly use computers to break
enterprise encryptions or reroute internet connections, which enables them
to pretend that their attacks on sensitive infrastructure originate from any
one of potentially millions of zombie computers. 10
For these reasons, Microsoft Windows XP’s end of support, combined
with a collective action problem stemming from individual users’ failure to
realize or internalize the costs of not migrating or upgrading their operating
systems, could prove catastrophic.
All of this could be avoided if Microsoft, as well as other intellectual
property owners who have monopoly power in a product market, allowed
for the creation of robust aftermarkets if they themselves elect to end
support. They could do this voluntarily. In Microsoft’s case, it could do so by
releasing Windows XP’s source code—the fundamental organizing

8. Paula Rosenblum, In Wake of Target Data Breach, Cash Becoming King Again,
FORBES (Mar. 17, 2014, 5:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/paularosenblum/2014/03/17/
in-wake-of-target-data-breach-cash-becoming-king-again.
9. Swapnil Bhartiya, Windows XP Will Die in April, What Are Your Options?,
MUKTWARE (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.muktware.com/2014/03/windows-xp-will-die-apriloptions/23434; Michael Endler, Windows XP Holdouts: 6 Top Excuses, INFORMATIONWEEK
(Mar. 17, 2014, 10:10 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/software/operating-systems/
windows-xp-holdouts-6-top-excuses/d/d-id/1127666.
10. See Lilian Edwards, Dawn of the Death of Distributed Denial of Service: How to Kill
Zombies, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 23, 26 (2006); Eugenia Georgiades et al., Crisis on
Impact: Responding to Cyber Attacks on Critical Information Infrastructures, 30 J. MARSHALL J.
INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 31, 32–33 (2013); T. Luis de Guzman, Unleashing A Cure for the
Botnet Zombie Plague: Cybertorts, Counterstrikes, and Privileges, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 527, 528–
31 (2010).
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instructions that make the program operate—under a carefully
circumscribed global license. 11
But the law could also obligate Microsoft to aid in the creation of such a
market, although here things turn murky. Under the leading understanding
of existing antitrust doctrine, if Windows XP were real property—a
photocopier, for example—the law would obligate Microsoft to help other
companies create an aftermarket for Windows XP support. Because
Microsoft Windows XP is not just property but intellectual property,
however, courts have been more reluctant to recognize a monopoly
exception to intellectual property protections. They should not be.
The following essay briefly sketches out the argument for why software
monopolists should be legally required to help other companies provide
ongoing support for their products. First, the essay describes the conceptual
and economic theories that would support such a requirement. Second, it
describes the conflicting law governing the intersection between intellectual
property and antitrust. Third, it exhorts Microsoft to extend the support
clock, release its source code, or make clear to the world that should anyone
else wish to take on the task of providing future security support for
Windows XP, Microsoft will help them to do so.
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY’S IMPERFECT ANALOGY TO “PROPERTY”
Software does not work quite like ordinary property. We ordinarily
think of goods as perishable or durable. Mostly, we worry about monopolies
over perishable goods, which can be used only once, in contrast to durable
goods, which can be used many times. Software appears to be a durable
good, and many economists subscribe to the view that durable goods cannot
be monopolized. Ronald Coase famously sketched a seven-page note that
“convincingly explained why a durapolist”—that is, a durable-goods
monopolist—“might not be able to exercise market power even if it held a
market share of 100 percent.” 12
In two important respects, however, software is not quite a classic
durable good. First, unlike in the case of a classic durable good, like a tenyear lightbulb, the world in which software exists is always shifting. In
particular, hackers pose a constant threat to software security, which means
that a consumer could go to bed on a Monday with a fully operational
supercomputer handling tens of billions of consumer credit transactions and
wake up on a Tuesday with a brick (that is, “an electronic device . . . that, due

11. Mark Gibbs, Microsoft, Instead of Turning The Lights Off On XP, Make It Open
Source, NETWORKWORLD (April 12, 2012, 2:24 PM), http://www.networkworld.com/
columnists/2012/041212-backspin-258214.html.
12. Barak Y. Orbach, The Durapolist Puzzle: Monopoly Power in Durable-Goods
Markets, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 67, 69 (2004) (citing Ronald H. Coase, Durability and Monopoly,
15 J.L. & ECON. 143 (1972)).
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to a serious misconfiguration, corrupted firmware, or a hardware problem,
can no longer function” 13).
Second, when it comes to software, only the developer generally
possesses the source code. This is both because the copyright laws make it
illegal to copy source code and because it is easy to encrypt this code and
keep it secret. As such, it is frequently, if not always, the case that only the
maker of a software program—or those who are authorized by its maker—
has the information he needs to fix software.
This is not how most property works. A Chevy does not expire because
Chevrolet decides to stop making the parts. If Chevrolet discontinues
making parts or ceases offering repair services, markets spring to life because
replacing a bolt, a casing, or a tire does not require someone to know how
the whole car fits together. Not so with software. Without access to the
source code, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to fix a software program.
As a result, software like Windows XP starts to appear less and less
durable, with its product market increasingly easy to monopolize. There are
high barriers to entry (you have to create an entirely new operating system of
your own to compete) and high switching costs (consumers have already
invested in many programs that only work with Windows XP), and
Microsoft has total control over the product’s aftermarket (because only it
possesses the source code and hence the ability to manipulate the code). This
last point is the most important. Durapolists “often argue that, in their case,
secondary markets . . . limit their ability to exercise market power.” 14 But
when other firms cannot intervene to keep Windows XP a viable competitor
of a newer version of Windows, Microsoft can use the decision to
discontinue support for Windows XP as an opportunity to ensure that
consumers switch to Windows’ next iteration. 15
II. THE UNEASY INTERSECTION BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
MONOPOLY
The law of antitrust is a mess, especially when it comes to durable-goods
monopolists. For physical goods, the leading case governing monopolists
who attempt to exercise control over aftermarkets has held that the antitrust
laws can create a duty to deal with those who seek to provide services or
maintenance for the monopoly good. By contrast, in cases addressing
intellectual goods, the opposite seems to hold.
In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., the Supreme
Court’s leading statement on the duties of physical durable-goods
monopolists, the Court held that a durable-goods seller could be required to
sell spare parts for its “complex business machines . . . high-volume

13. Brick (electronics), WIKIPEDIA (Mar. 16, 2014, 5:56 AM), http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Brick_(electronics).
14. Orbach, supra note 12, at 112.
15. Id. at 109–10.
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photocopiers[,] and micrographic equipment” to competitors, who would
perform the actual installation and support services. 16 The Court held that
Kodak’s refusal to sell parts to Independent Service Organizations (“ISOs”)
made it more difficult for them to sell services for Kodak machines, and, as a
result, “ISOs were unable to obtain parts from reliable sources . . . and many
were forced out of business, while others lost substantial revenues . . . [and]
[c]ustomers were forced to switch to Kodak service even though they
preferred ISO service.” 17
Kodak, then, could stand for the principle that where a durable-good
provider (Kodak was not even a monopolist in the copier market) can
control the aftermarket for maintenance on its product, it has a duty to aid
rival providers in making that aftermarket competitive. The rationale of
Kodak is that a company’s creation of one really great product should not
entitle it to either renegotiate an expensive support plan at some later date or
force users to switch to another one of its products—at least, not without
giving competitors the opportunity to offer a third option: a reasonably
priced support plan of their own.
Examining the legal developments in the wake of Kodak, particularly its
interactions with intellectual property laws, shows that the case’s core
principle has not taken hold. 18 In one of the leading cases at the intersection
of durable-goods monopoly and intellectual property—yet another lawsuit
over photocopiers—the Federal Circuit held that there is no duty to help
create an aftermarket for goods protected by intellectual property rights. The
patent and copyright laws affirmatively protected from antitrust scrutiny
Xerox’s refusal to sell or license its patented and copyrighted products to
ISOs. Troublingly, the Xerox case was nearly identical to Kodak except that
the parts Xerox refused to sell or license were either patented or
copyrighted. 19 A similar rationale held in another major case following
Kodak, this one out of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In
Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., the Ninth Circuit
admirably declined to adopt a per se exemption from antitrust liability where
16. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992).
17. Id. at 458.
18. See Harry First, Microsoft and the Evolution of the Intellectual Property Concept,
2006 WIS. L. REV. 1369, 1422–32 (describing the marked difference in the analysis employed in
Kodak from that used in subsequent cases while arguing that courts should scrutinize
intellectual property claims to ensure that monopolies do not use such claims as tools to block
competition and stifle innovation); Daniel J. Gifford, Antitrust’s Troubled Relations with
Intellectual Property, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1695, 1710–18 (2003) (explaining that the Supreme
Court’s approach in Kodak has not “prevailed” in the intellectual property aftermarket cases,
leading to “confusion in the case law”).
19. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000); id. at 1328
(“Xerox was under no obligation to sell or license its patented parts and did not violate the
antitrust laws by refusing to do so.”); id. at 1329 (“Xerox’s refusal to sell or license its
copyrighted works was squarely within the rights granted by Congress to the copyright holder
and did not constitute a violation of the antitrust laws.”).
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a party refuses to sell or license intellectual property. But the court did hold
that the existence of such intellectual property rights creates a presumption
of legitimate business justification for anticompetitive conduct. 20
III. SOLUTION: SOFTWARE AS PROPERTY LIKE ANY OTHER
The intellectual property–antitrust cases seem to overlook the animating
purpose behind these laws: consumer welfare. Presently, two cross-cutting
intellectual property paradigms protect software as intellectual property: (1)
the patent laws that protect any properly patented new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter (lasting roughly twenty
years) and (2) the copyright laws that protect original works of authorship
from unauthorized reproduction, derivation, distribution, performance, or
display (lasting roughly a century). 21 These two statutes are meant to
promote innovation. The antitrust laws, by contrast, are intended to prevent
firms from controlling prices or excluding competition. 22 But all three of
these regulatory frameworks are designed, in the end, to enhance consumer
welfare.
By electing to end support for Windows XP while guarding the secrecy
of its source code and threatening to punish those who copy the code as part
of their own efforts to continue to produce security updates, Microsoft does
in fact exercise its statutory property right to prevent unauthorized copying.
But it also obtains power over price. Given the purposes of both sets of laws,
the ultimate question should be whether Microsoft’s decision to prevent
anyone from maintaining Windows XP as a secure, viable operating system
reduces overall consumer welfare.
The math is not even close.
Thousands of companies would gladly pay Microsoft—or anyone—to
ensure that the millions of people who will not be switching to a newer
version of Windows XP on April 8 do not become unwitting soldiers in
hackers’ botnet armies. Governments that invest billions in consumer
protection would readily pay to protect those consumers from the effects of
Microsoft’s decision to end support. While there may be harms to future
innovation that might result from requiring Microsoft potentially to disclose
the inner-workings of a thirteen-year-old operating system to some
aftermarket competitors, Microsoft itself could prevent any such harm by
simply continuing to offer support itself. Or, even more admirably,
Microsoft could simply release the Windows XP source code.

20. 125 F.3d 1195, 1217 (9th Cir. 1997).
21. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
22. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1956); see
Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO.
L.J. 241, 247–48 (1987) (explaining that “market power” and “monopoly power” both refer to
companies’ ability to “price profitably above marginal cost” but represent two independent
means of achieving this end—controlling prices or excluding competition—approximately
corresponding to the twin prongs in du Pont).
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Unfortunately, the legal system offers few paths to a remedy. Microsoft’s
Windows XP source code is already secret, and no legitimate business would
reverse engineer the code simply to face a devastating copyright lawsuit.
Furthermore, because companies lack access to the source code and
therefore cannot otherwise articulate a way that they could create an
aftermarket in Windows XP security updates and patches, it is almost
inconceivable that a company would be able to maintain an antitrust claim
against Microsoft for failure to continue providing XP support. A federal
entity, like the Department of Justice or Federal Trade Commission, could
attempt to make Microsoft deal with its aftermarket competitors. There’s
only one problem: Microsoft has no aftermarket competitors because
Windows XP’s source code is both secret and copyrighted. Alternatively,
consumers themselves could bring suit against Microsoft, but such claims
are, at best, years away, and the law in this area—as has been shown—favors
owners of intellectual property rights over consumers.
This is a terrible conundrum, one that cries out for a legislative solution.
Make no mistake: Microsoft’s decision to end support for Windows XP
could be one of the most consequential decisions made by any major
institution this year. Society will soon need to rethink many old notions like
property, competition, and innovation in a world where networked
computers store individuals’ most important and intimate personal
information. 23
Until the law catches up, however, it will fall to Microsoft alone to make
the right decision. The company should extend the support clock, release its
source code, or make clear to the world that if anyone else endeavors to
provide future security support for Windows XP, Microsoft will help them
do so.

23. See generally BJ Ard, Confidentiality and the Problem of Third Parties: Protecting
Reader Privacy in the Age of Intermediaries, 6 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2013) (privacy); Jane
Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57 (2014) (speech); Oren Bracha & Frank
Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of
Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149 (2008) (competition); James Grimmelmann, The Internet Is a
Semicommons, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2799 (2010) (property); Andrew Tutt, The New Speech, 41
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235 (2013) (democracy and autonomy).

